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SECRET

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85 6397154 SSR

TOR: 070948Z FEB 85

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FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1968

INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8577

RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1658

RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 6993

RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 7156

RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 3240

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0690

ZEN/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN (POUCH)

BT

EZ1:

S E C R E T SINGAPORE 01528

EXDIS

EZ2:

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CB, SN

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF SENIOR COS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

- OFFICIALS ON CAMBODIA

1. . S-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON FEBRUARY 6, DURING A CONVERSATION WITH IMBS
 DIRECTOR WINDER, MFA SECOND PERMANENT SECRETARY PETER
 CHAN EXPRESSED ~~CAMBODIA'S CONTINUING INTEREST IN~~

~~SEEKING THE US TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN EFFORTS TO~~

~~ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM.~~ HE

SAID THE ASEAN COUNTRIES DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND US

RELUCTANCE TO PLAY A BIGGER ROLE. HE BELIEVED IT

WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ~~ENGAGE THE US IN A DIALOGUE AS~~

TO HOW ONE MIGHT REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN

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CAMBODIA AND WHAT THE USG ROLE WOULD BE.

3. CHAN SAID ~~THE NEXT TWO YEARS MAY BE CRITICAL. HE~~
~~POINTED OUT THE VIETNAMESE ARE SAYING EITHER SETTLEMENT~~
~~NOW OR WE WILL IMPOSE A SOLUTION OVER TIME. IN THE~~
~~NEXT TWO YEARS, WE MUST PERSUADE THE VIETNAMESE THAT~~
~~THE CGDK CAN PREVENT THIS. WE HAVE TO CONVINCE~~
~~VIETNAM THAT FAR FROM BEING ABLE TO IMPOSE A~~
~~SOLUTION OVER TIME, WHAT THEY ARE LOOKING AT IS A~~
~~CONTINUALLY DETERIORATING SITUATION, NOT AN IMPROVED~~
~~ONE. HE BELIEVED THAT INCREASED US-USSR CONTACTS~~
~~WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO GROWING VIETNAMESE INSECURITY.~~

4. CHAN SAID THAT WE DO NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
THE CGDK CAN BRING THE VIETNAMESE TO THEIR KNEES OR
THAT THEY ARE A FIRST-CLASS FIGHTING MACHINE, ONLY
THAT THEY CAN HOLD THEIR OWN, CONTINUE TO GROW AND
INFLECT SERIOUS DAMAGE ON THE VIETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA.
THIS IS NOT DIFFICULT, SAID CHAN, BUT WHAT IS NEEDED
IS TO INCREASE THE QUALITY OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP
AND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE FOOT SOLDIERS. THIS IS
THE SORT OF EFFORT IN WHICH THE US COULD TAKE A MORE
DIRECT ROLE. OF COURSE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE THAIS, HE NOTED, BUT, SAID CHAN,
AN AMERICAN INPUT WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN THE BELIEF
ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE THAT THE CGDK WILL NOT
ONLY SURVIVE, BUT THAT THEIR DIFFICULTIES WITH THE
CGDK WILL INCREASE AND THAT IT WILL BE A PERPETUAL
PROBLEM.

5. ~~HOWEVER UNPLEASANT THE PRESENCE OF THE KHMER ROUGE,~~
~~CHAN SAID, WITHOUT THEIR PRESENCE IT WOULD BE~~
~~IMPROBABLE THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CGDK COULD BE~~
~~MAINTAINED.~~ WITH REGARD TO THE CHINESE ROLE AND WHY
THE CHINESE HAVE NOT DELIVERED A SECOND LESSON TO THE
VIETNAMESE, AND SEEMED UNLIKELY TO DO SO, CHAN SAID THAT
HE DOUBTED THE CHINESE WOULD BE WILLING TO STAND THE
COST OF A FURTHER MAJOR MILITARY EFFORT ON THE BORDER.
NONETHELESS, THE CHINESE CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL
TOWARDS CONVINCING VIETNAM THERE IS NO LIGHT AT THE
END OF THE TUNNEL. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
PRESSURE, FROM A COUNTRY LIKE CHINA WHOSE ECONOMY IS
RAPIDLY LEAVING THE VIETNAMESE FURTHER AND FURTHER
BEHIND, WILL EVENTUALLY RESULT IN A REASONABLE
VIETNAMESE POSITION.

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